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Abstract 
We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effect of extrinsic rewards, both financial 
and non-financial, on the performance of agents recruited by a public health organization to 
promote HIV prevention and sell condoms. In this setting: (i) non-financial rewards are effective 
at improving performance; (ii) the effect of both types of rewards is stronger for pro-socially 
motivated agents; and (iii) both types of rewards are effective when their relative value is high. 
The findings illustrate that extrinsic rewards can improve the performance of agents engaged 
in public service delivery, and that non-financial rewards can be effective in settings where the 
power of financial incentives is limited. 
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1 Introduction
Understanding what motivates individuals to devote time and eﬀort to work endeavors is a
question that lies at the core of the social sciences. The answer is crucial both to understanding
observed behavior and to designing incentive mechanisms that align the individuals’ interests with
the interests of the organization for which they work. As a consequence, the design of optimal
incentive contracts has been the subject of extensive theoretical and empirical research.
Empirical contributions, however, mainly focus on the eﬀect of financial rewards in settings in
which employee eﬀort only benefits the employer (Bandiera et al. 2011; Oyer and Schaefer 2011).
Much less attention has been paid to incentives in organizations, such as governmental and non-
governmental organizations, which hire agents to perform pro-social tasks;–namely, tasks that create
benefits enjoyed by those other than the employer and employees. A notable exception is the
literature on the eﬀect of monetary incentives on teachers’ performance, which finds markedly
mixed results (Duflo et al. 2012; Fryer 2013; Lavy 2002; Glewwe et al. 2010; Muralidharan and
Sundararaman 2011).
The theoretical literature suggests reasons why the eﬀect of extrinsic rewards on performance in
private and pro-social tasks might diﬀer. Mission-driven organizations benefit from matching with
workers whose interests are aligned with the mission, and these individuals might respond less to
incentives or even deliver a weaker performance if incentives displace other sources of motivation. In
particular, to the extent that agents are motivated by the externalities generated through pro-social
tasks, this motivation may interact positively or negatively with extrinsic incentives (Benabou and
Tirole 2003, 2006; Besley and Ghatak 2005; Dixit 2002).
Informed by these insights, we design a field experiment to evaluate the eﬀect of extrinsic rewards
on the performance of agents in a public health organization. The experiment is designed to compare
the eﬀects of monetary and non-monetary incentives, as both are commonly used in practice,1 but
their relative eﬀectiveness for public service delivery is understudied.2 The experiment is designed to
measure the interaction between extrinsic rewards and the pro-social motivation of the agents, and
to test whether this interaction diﬀers between financial and non-financial rewards. We collaborate
with a public health organization based in Lusaka, Zambia, which recruits and trains hairdressers
and barbers to provide information about HIV prevention and sell condoms in their shops.
The experiment randomly assigns 205 distinct geographical clusters containing 1,222 agents
to one of four groups that receive diﬀerent rewards based on condom sales. Agents in the control
1Many organizations, ranging from large corporations to NGOs, use a range of non-financial performance rewards
to motivate their employees. For example, Larkin (2011) uses observational data to study a non-linear incentive
scheme that provides employees of a software firm with a “gold star” and company-wide recognition if they meet an
annual performance threshold. His evidence suggests that employees forgo 27,000 USD worth of revenue to obtain
the non-financial reward.
2Kube et al. (2012) compare the eﬀect of monetary and non-monetary rewards on the performance of agents
engaged in a task (book sorting) that has no pro-social elements. They find that the non-monetary reward, a water
bottle, is more eﬀective than the equivalent cash amount.
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group receive no rewards, while agents in the three treatment groups receive financial margins at the
bottom and the top of the feasible range, and non-financial rewards, respectively. The smaller and
larger financial-margin treatments pay a 10% and 90% margin on each condom sale, respectively,
whereas the non-financial scheme (“star” treatment) gives agents a “thermometer” display, showing
condom sales and stamps, with one star stamp for each sale.
The first part of our empirical analysis shows that non-financial rewards are eﬀective at pro-
moting sales: agents in the star treatment sell over twice as many condoms as agents in any other
group, on average. We track agents’ performance over one year, and thus can separate responses
due to the novelty of the program from long-run responses. The estimates are stable throughout
the one-year period, thus ruling out novelty eﬀects. The magnitude of the estimated treatment
eﬀects is such that, had all agents been oﬀered non-financial incentives, they would have sold 23,102
condoms, compared to 10,732 / 12,006 / 12,562 had they all been oﬀered the volunteer contract,
small financial margins and large financial margins, respectively.
That financial incentives are ineﬀective might be due to earnings from condom sales being a
small fraction of overall earnings, because both demand for the product and earnings from each sale
are low. Since demand for the product and the cost of eﬀort are orthogonal to treatment, our results
imply that the agents’ marginal utility of stars is higher than their marginal utility of money, given
their initial endowments of money and stars. In general, we expect there to be a threshold level
of financial rewards such that all rewards above that threshold would be more eﬀective at eliciting
eﬀort than non-financial incentives, and indeed, as we describe below, we find suggestive evidence
that financial rewards are eﬀective for the poorest agents in the sample, for whom the relative value
is higher.
The second part of the analysis explores mechanisms driving the estimated treatment eﬀects.
We begin by assessing whether treatments diﬀer because they make the agents exert diﬀerent levels
of eﬀort, or because they aﬀect demand directly. We provide three pieces of evidence on this matter.
First, we show that agents in the star treatment behave diﬀerently on dimensions correlated with
sales eﬀort, such as displaying promotional materials and filling in sales records. This rules out that
the star treatment increases sales exclusively by increasing demand. Second, we survey a random
sample of customers to probe the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent promotional materials; most surveyed
customers recall and correctly describe the promotional posters given to agents in all treatments,
but only a negligible minority mentions the thermometer that is only given to agents in the star
treatment. Third, we implement a “placebo” star-reward treatment; namely, we randomly provide
a subsample of salons in the control and financial reward treatments with a thermometer that,
to a third party, looks identical to the treatment thermometer, and hence is an equally eﬀective
advertising tool, but carries no reward for the agent, as the stars stamped on it represent the average
sales in the area. We find that the placebo star treatment has no eﬀect on sales, which allays the
concern that the star treatment increases sales by stimulating demand.
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The next step of our analysis provides evidence on the interaction between extrinsic incen-
tives and intrinsic motivation for the cause. To this purpose, we measure motivation through an
adapted dictator game where agents can make a donation to an existing charity that provides care
to HIV/AIDS patients. We find that the donation is a strong predictor of sales performance; agents
who donate more than the median sell 51 percent more condoms than the average agent in the
control group. We find that agents who are motivated by the cause respond more strongly to finan-
cial rewards, which is in direct contradiction to the hypothesis that extrinsic incentives crowd out
intrinsic motivation. We also find a positive interaction between high donation and non-financial
rewards, suggesting that extrinsic incentives are complementary to pro-social motivation in this
context.
Findings from the final step of our analysis reveal that the point estimates of responses to
both financial and non-financial incentives are larger when the utility associated with financial
and non-financial rewards, respectively, is high. In particular, our results suggest that financial
incentives increase sales for the poorest agents in our sample, for whom the relative value of rewards
is higher. To measure the relative value of non-financial incentives, we exploit the intuition that
these might be more valuable when they are visible to a larger peer group. To implement this
test, we exploit the naturally occurring variation in the number of salons in each neighborhood.
We find suggestive evidence that the marginal eﬀect of non-financial incentives is increasing in the
number of neighboring salons that also received non-financial incentives, whereas the response to
the other incentive treatments is not aﬀected by the number of neighboring salons that receive the
same treatment.
Our findings contribute to the broad literature evaluating the eﬀect of incentives in for-profit
firms and to the nascent literature studying how to motivate agents engaged in pro-social activities
(see, for example, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Lacetera et al. 2011; Meier 2007; Mellström and
Johannesson 2008). Most of the related literature on public services delivery focuses on performance
incentives for teachers (Duflo et al. 2012; Fryer 2013; Lavy 2002; Glewwe et al. 2010; Muralidharan
and Sundararaman 2011) with two recent exceptions, both of which analyze the delivery of health
services. Miller et al. (2012) evaluate the eﬀect of providing financial incentives to school principals
to reduce anemia among students in rural China and find a modest eﬀect. Olken et al. (2014)
study an intervention that links the disbursement of aid to the performance of health services at
the village level in Indonesia and find that linking aid to performance improves health indicators.3
In the context of this literature, our paper provides the first field comparison of monetary and
non-monetary incentives and how these interact with motivation for public services delivery.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the context, data and research
design. Section 3 discusses the identification strategy. Sections 4 and 5 present the findings, and
3Related research examines the eﬀect of salary levels on selection into the health sector and performance (Propper
and Van Reenen 2010; Dal Bó et al. 2013).
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section 6 concludes with a discussion of costs and benefits of the diﬀerent schemes and the external
validity of our findings.
2 Context, Data and Research Design
2.1 Context
The field experiment was run in collaboration with the Society for Family Health (SFH), a
public health organization based in Lusaka, Zambia. The experiment was embedded in SFH’s
new program for HIV prevention through the distribution of female condoms by hair salons. Our
setting is representative of many health delivery programs in developing countries, where embedded
community agents are called upon to deliver services and products, and where eﬀective incentive
design remains a significant challenge (Bhattacharyya and Winch 2001; Mathauer and Imhoﬀ 2006).
We collaborated with SFH closely at each stage of the program, including salon selection, training,
incentive design and monthly restocking visits, for one year, from December 2009 to December
2010.4 To ensure behavior was not aﬀected by experimenter eﬀects, we designed the experiment to
fit within SFH standard procedures and agents were not aware that they were part of an experiment.5
In the program under study, hairstylists were identified as ideal agents for the delivery of this
health service, both because the familiarity between the stylist and the client creates the potential
for successful targeting of female condoms to “at risk” customers, and because during the period that
a client is in the salon, he or she is a captive audience, allowing the stylist to provide information
about HIV prevention generally, and specifically about the female condom. Finally, hair salons are
numerous and distributed throughout Lusaka. Our census of salons, implemented as part of the
research design, found just over 2,500 hair salons, serving a population of about 2 million (2,198,996,
according to the 2010 Census of Population and Housing for Zambia).
In this context, the agents’ choice variable is the level of eﬀort to devote to the diﬀusion of
information about HIV and to the sale of female condoms. Since this product is new and unfamiliar
to customers, the agents must exert eﬀort in explaining the female condom’s proper use and benefits
in order to persuade customers to make a purchase. For repeat customers, the hair stylists have the
opportunity to follow up in order to encourage repeat use and troubleshoot any barriers to future
purchase. Eﬀort is costly in terms of forgone time spent discussing other topics that might be either
more enjoyable or lead to the sale of other products available in the salon, such as clothes or hair
4Female condoms are embraced by many in the public health community as the only female-controlled tool
for HIV/AIDS and other STI prevention (PATH UNFPA 2006). Young, married women are the fastest growing
demographic infected with HIV (UNAIDS et al. 2004). Adoption rates for female condoms are higher in Sub-
Saharan Africa than in most parts of the world and earlier work in Zambia indicates that both men and women have
expressed interest in the female condom (HLSP 2007).
5The experiment is a “natural field experiment” in Harrison and List’s (2004) taxonomy, in that all research
activities were embedded in SFH’s normal activities.
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products. Promoting female condoms has a strong pro-social component, since the use of condoms
creates positive externalities for society at large. Condoms are an eﬀective means of preventing the
spread of HIV/AIDS and Zambia has one of the world’s highest adult HIV-prevalence rates at 14.3
percent (Government Republic of Zambia 2010). Stylists are aware of the pro-social nature of the
task because of extensive informational campaigns run by the Ministry of Health on the importance
of condoms for HIV prevention.
The program has four stages: (i) SFH attempts to distribute invitation letters to a one-day
training program for the sale of female condoms to 1,222 stylists; (ii) of these, 981 can be reached
and receive the letter; (iii) of these, 771 accept, undergo training, find out which type of reward
they can earn (if any), and choose whether to purchase condoms from SFH to sell in their salons;
(iv) of these, 747 join, are required to purchase 12 packs at the subsidized price of 2000 ZMK6 (166
ZMK, or about 3.32 cents of a dollar per pack), and are given a range of promotional materials,
including posters and display units. Thereafter, dispensers or single packs can be purchased at 500
ZMK per pack, either during a monthly restocking visit by SFH representatives or by calling a
toll-free number dedicated to the female condom program. These are standard SFH practices for
the distribution of health products.7 The retail price is set at 500 ZMK for a pack of two condoms,
which is the same price as the male condom.
2.2 Data
Our sample consists of the 771 stylists who participated in the training program and were exposed
to treatment. Our main outcome variable is sales performance. Our preferred measure of sales is
the number of packs each stylist restocks from SFH over the study period. Restocking is precisely
measured from SFH inventory data and checked against invoices signed by the agents upon purchase.
Restocking is mechanically correlated with customer sales, as there is no reason for agents to buy
stock if they do not plan to sell it. Most importantly, restocking is the performance measure used
to compute financial and non-financial rewards. Since rewards are not paid on the 12 packs agents
were required to purchase at training, these 12 packs are excluded from our restocking measure.
Table 1 shows that, on average, agents restock 9 packs, and the median is 0; namely, more than half
of the agents do not purchase condoms from SFH other than at training. The standard deviation
is 18 packs, indicating a fair amount of variation in performance. These sales data illustrate that
the demand for female condoms is low, but that some agents manage to overcome this.
6In 2010, USD 1 was equivalent to about 5000 ZMK. Average monthly urban household income in Zambia in 2010
was 1,779,000 ZMK (Government of Zambia, ?).
7SFH representatives were instructed to stop attempting to visit stylists who could not be found for three con-
secutive visits, i.e., three consecutive months. By the end of the experimental year, 218 salons fell in this category.
These stylists, however, were still formally enrolled in the program, and they could have called the toll-free number to
resume the visits or restock condoms and are included in the sample throughout with sales of zero for each restocking
visit.
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Our alternative measure of performance is calculated by SFH sales representatives, by subtract-
ing the hairdresser’s stock at month t from the sales representative’s record of stock at t− 1. Sales
representatives measure stock each time they visit the salon by counting the number of packs on
display and confirming with the stylists that no other packs are stored elsewhere. This variable
suﬀers from measurement error due to the fact that unsold packs might not be visible to the SFH
representative and/or hidden intentionally. Despite this potential for errors, the correlation between
the calculated sales and the restocking measures is 0.92. Table 1 shows that the average calculated
sales are 13.9 packs. The discrepancy between the two measures is due to the fact that calculated
sales includes the 12 packs purchased at training and that it is likely to be biased upward, as every
pack the sales representative cannot see in the salon is counted as sold.
In addition to sales performance, table 1 reports four variables collected by SFH sales repre-
sentatives to proxy for the agents’ sales eﬀort: (i) the quantity of promotional materials displayed
in the shop, such as posters and “sold here” signs (mean 2.26, sd 0.9); (ii) the probability that the
stylists fill in their logbooks as instructed (47% of them do); (iii) the sales representatives’ subjective
evaluation of the stylists’ interest in selling and promoting the female condoms (mean of 2.15 out
of 3); and (iv) their judgement of the stylists’ attention level at the time of the visit (mean of 2.52
out of 3).
Panel B, table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the agents’ and salons’ traits. These are collected
via a census survey administered to all stylists in Lusaka before the start of the program.8 Panel B
illustrates that the salons in our sample are evenly split between hairdressers (only female clients)
and barbers (only male clients) and a small minority (8%) caters to both men and women. We
combine female and mixed salons in the analysis, to capture demand from female clients. 88% of
the sample salons are located near a bar, which is a strong determinant of demand for condoms.
23% of the sample agents are Catholic, which might be a hindrance to selling condoms, as these were
not approved by the Catholic Church at the time of the experiment. Salon size is typically small:
the average salon has 1.75 employees and the median is 2. The average number of trained salons in
the same area, a proxy for competition in the market for female condoms, is 4.5. A substantial share
of agents (27%) sell products in their salons, suggesting that at least some of these agents already
have some experience acting as sale agents. Panel C describes other products sold by agents in the
sample: none have experience selling health products or male condoms, which could be substituted
8To minimize interference with the normal management of the condom distribution program, the survey was
presented as a research activity and not linked in any way to the condom distribution program. The census was
carried out from July to September 2009; the survey lasted for an average of 35 minutes. Two data collection teams
worked concurrently. The first team consisted of scouts responsible for locating all salons and collecting GPS data.
The second team then visited the shop and carried out the interview. Questions regarding the business included
the type and quantity of equipment owned (mirrors, chairs, roller trays, dryers, etc.), the number of employees, the
number and type of clients, the nature and prices of oﬀered services and products, the monthly revenues and profit,
and the time since opening. Questions about the manager included demographics, the stylist’s peer network, employee
status in the salon, monthly earnings, length of employment/ownership, other-regarding preferences/attitude, and
living conditions.
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for by female condoms.
Panel B also shows that 19% of agents in the sample have “low socio-economic status,” which
encompasses those who do not speak English or have not completed primary education. In the
absence of a reliable measure of wealth, these are the best proxies of socio-economic status in our
setting. The next variable aims to measure the main source of motivation for the agents’ day-to-day
job. We asked stylists to identify what they enjoy most about their job among: “making money,”
“being own boss,” “making people look nice,” “being connected to the community,” and “other.”.
The share of stylists choosing each of these are 35 percent, 6 percent, 44 percent, 14 percent and
1 percent, respectively. To measure work motivation we generate a dichotomous variable, coding
the first two options as extrinsic and the second two as intrinsic.9 58% of agents report being
intrinsically motivated, according to this definition.
To elicit an incentive-compatible measure of pro-social motivation toward HIV causes, we de-
signed a contextualized dictator game, which was implemented by SFH personnel during the training
program.10 Agents were told that, in addition to the training show-up fee (40,000 ZMK), each of
them would receive 12,500 ZMK, which they could keep for themselves or donate, in part or in full,
to a well-known charity in Lusaka that provides care to HIV/AIDS patients, including antiretrovi-
ral treatment.11 The amount donated is taken as a proxy for the agents’ motivation for the cause.
Since this is likely to be correlated with the agents’ wealth, it is always used together with asset-
and socio-economic-status measures in the analysis that follows. It is important to acknowledge
that while donations may be higher than the individuals’ truly-preferred amounts, because of social
pressure (DellaVigna et al. 2012), the measure is still valid for our purposes as long as ranks are
preserved so that more motivated agents donate more than agents who are less motivated, even if
9Results are robust to alternative ways of coding the baseline survey responses, for instance by coding “being own
boss” and “other” as separate motivations.
10Previous work by Lagarde and Blaauw (2013) on South African nurses shows that the dictator game is eﬀective
in identifying socially-motivated workers. They found that student nurses who were more generous in an adapted
dictator game to anonymous patients were more likely to choose a rural hardship post, where both social impacts
and personal sacrifices are larger.
11Specific instructions for the game were scripted and read aloud. The script read: “We have recently received
additional money for today’s training. As a consequence we have suﬃcient funds to give each of you an additional
12,500 ZMK. [This was in addition to the 40,000 show up fee]. You can choose how much of this sum to keep for
yourselves and how much to donate to Our Lady’s Hospice, a local charity that provides palliative care that includes
oﬀering ART (antiretroviral therapy) for their HIV patients. If you wish to donate, please put your donation in the
envelope provided with this form [form has pre-printed ID number on it] and drop it in the collection box. Note that
the amount you donate is totally up to you: you can give nothing, part of the 12,500 ZMK, or the entire thing. The
amount you contribute will be kept completely confidential. We will give you a few minutes to think about it. When
you’ve taken a decision, please drop your envelope in the box at the front.” While instructions were being read, the
helpers distributed identical pre-arranged packets of 12,500 ZMK in small bills to each participant. While the need
to collect individual measures of altruism obviously prevents us from guaranteeing full anonymity, the design ensured
that individual choices were not observable by other participants or by the training personnel. After receiving the
money, stylists were guided one at a time to one of five booths where they counted the sum and separated the amount
they kept from the amount they donated. The bills donated were placed in an envelope and sealed before leaving the
booth. Each participant then deposited the envelope in a box sitting in front of the room, specially designed for this
purpose.
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they all donate more than they would in the absence of social pressure. The average donation in
the dictator game is 5,729 ZMK; that is, 45% of the total endowment. More importantly for our
purpose, the measure exhibits considerable variation, as its standard deviation is 3,745 ZMK.
Finally, panel C reports other agents’ traits that, while not used directly in the analysis, can be
helpful to put the experiment and the results in context. The weekly income of the average salon is
332,569 ZMK; 94% agents are literate and can thus easily read SFH’s invitation letter and further
communications, and 85% are literate in English.
2.3 Research Design: Treatment Groups
Agents are randomly assigned to one of four groups. Agents in the control group are recruited
as volunteers and receive no incentives, financial or otherwise.
Agents in the large financial-margin treatment receive 450 ZMK for each condom pack sold,
a 90 percent margin over the retail price. 450 ZMK is the highest incentive-compatible margin, since
agents would have the incentive to buy and dispose of the condoms if the reward were larger than
the purchase price. To put these numbers in context, consider that the average stylist in our sample
charges 3,000 ZMK for a haircut. Whether devoting time to condom sales is more profitable than
devoting time to cutting hair therefore depends on whether stylists can sell a pack in less than
1/6th of the time it takes them to do a haircut, other things equal. Thus the power of the rewards
depends on other things that aﬀect sales, including demand.12
Agents in the small financial-margin treatment receive 50 ZMK for each condom pack
sold, a 10 percent margin over the retail price. 50 ZMK is the smallest bill commonly in circulation,
making this the smallest payment that is easily implementable. The comparison of the two financial
incentive treatments allows us to test whether financial incentives crowd out motivation when they
are low-powered, as found in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000).
Agents in the non-financial reward (star) treatment group receive a star for each condom
pack sold. These agents are provided with a thermometer display, akin to those used in charitable
fundraisers. Each sale is rewarded with a star stamped on the thermometer, which is labelled as
measuring the stylist’s contribution to the health of their community. The thermometer display
is designed to create a visual link between packs sold and health outcomes, making social impact
salient (Grant 2007) and eﬀectively rewarding stylists for marginal contributions to the cause. In
addition, stylists were told that all those who sell more than 216 packs over a year would be awarded
a certificate at a ceremony.
Three points are of note. First, rewards are a function of the number of condoms each agent
12We note that agents in the large financial-margin treatment face a lower marginal cost (50 instead of 500) and
can, in principle, boost sales by reducing the price. This incentive is common to all sales-based bonuses and quota
schemes, i.e., sales people can increase sales by passing some of their reward to customers. This practice is not
detrimental to the principal as long as they want to maximize sales revenues. We collect data on prices to test
whether agents implemented this strategy.
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restocks every month from SFH’s invoice data. Rewards are not paid for the packs purchased at a
subsidized price during the training program.
Second, SFH representatives visit each salon once per month13 and pay rewards (financial and
non-financial) based on the number of packs the agent bought during the previous restocking visit.14
This ensures that rewards can be computed at headquarters and that the sales representatives carry
the exact quantity of rewards to give at each visit.15
Third, the design of the non-financial reward scheme was driven by the need to balance two
equally important considerations: realism and comparability with the financial incentives schemes.
We thus included a commonly observed feature of non-financial rewards (the certificate to top
performers) while ensuring that agents in all treatments earn a reward for each pack sold. Therefore,
at low sale levels, financial and non-financial incentives have the same linear structure; at high sale
levels the non-financial scheme has an additional lump sum benefit past a given threshold. Whether
this diﬀerence can drive diﬀerences in performance is a matter for empirical analysis.
2.4 Research Design: Randomization
Assignment to treatment is randomized at the neighborhood level with buﬀer zones between
neighborhoods, so that all agents in the same neighborhood are assigned to the same treatment
and salons’ neighbors are either in the same treatment or not part of the program. To implement
the design, we first conducted a census of all hair salons in Lusaka, collecting GPS coordinates and
numerous salon and stylist characteristics. We then imposed a grid on the GPS-mapped locations of
the salons, to divide the city into equal geographical areas of 650 by 650 meters each. We excluded
13Five full-time sales representatives were trained to carry out visits and they rotated between salons and treat-
ments. Restocking visits lasted approximately one hour, during which sales representatives followed a detailed script
and recorded both observational and survey data. Besides collecting data, representatives answered queries about
the program, distributed promotional materials, allowed the stylists to restock and handed out incentive payments.
14Delaying the delivery of rewards by five weeks may lower the value of the reward if stylists have high discount
rates, though stylists making regular sales receive rewards each restocking visit. Though restocking decisions are
oﬀset by five weeks from incentive delivery, the diﬀerent incentive treatments do have the potential to influence
the impact of liquidity constraints on restocking. Specifically, stylists in either of the financial incentives may have
more cash on hand after the delivery of incentives from restocking during the previous visit. Sales agents elicited
restocking decisions before incentives were handed out to mitigate this problem. However, if stylists changed their
mind about restocking after receiving incentives, they were allowed to purchase more. We record these restocking
decisions separately. Stylists in the high financial-margins treatment do not change their decision significantly more
than stylists in the volunteer control, which suggests that liquidity constraint diﬀerences do not have a meaningful
eﬀect on restocking. Stylists in the star reward treatment, on the other hand, do significantly increase their restocking
decision after receiving their reward, relative to the volunteer control group.
15At the end of the restocking session, all agents in the control group were told: “Now, I have good news for you
today. Because of your hard work and great sales performance in the last month, you have potentially protected. . . [#
of packs x 2]. . . sexual intercourses. You have therefore helped your clients protect themselves against STIs and
unplanned pregnancies.” Agents in the reward treatments were told “Now, I have good news for you today. Because
of your hard work and great sales performance in the last month, you have earned a reward of . . . . . . (Kwacha or
stars). In addition to that, you have potentially protected . . . .. [# of packs x 2] sexual intercourses. You have
therefore helped your clients protect themselves against STIs and unplanned pregnancies.”
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a buﬀer of 75 meters on all sides of the grid cell, resulting in at least 150 meters between salons
in adjacent areas. The resulting areas, each measuring 250,000 square meters, served as the unit
of randomization. Salons located in buﬀer areas were not invited to join the program. The final
sample for randomization consists of 205 distinct neighborhoods, containing 1,222 hair salons.16
To increase power, we balance on a vector of variables that are likely to aﬀect condom sales.
These are: salon type (hairdresser or barber); salon size (proxied by the number of employees);
whether the salon is located near a bar (a proxy for condom demand); the number of salons in
the same cell; the agents’ total assets; whether the agent reports giving to charitable causes; and
whether the agent sells other products in their salon. Randomization is implemented via the minmax
t-stat method for the vector of balance variables across 1,000 random draws. Figure 1 illustrates the
geographic outcome of the randomization. Appendix table A.1 presents the means and standard
deviations of all the balance variables, for the additional control variables that we use in the analysis
by treatment status, and for the additional summary statistics described in table 1. The table also
includes the largest normalized diﬀerence across treatment pairs, the p-values of the tests of equal
means for all pairwise combinations and the p-value of the joint test that all control variables are
equal across the four groups. Normalized diﬀerences for all variables are small, and all but one
are well below the 0.25 critical value identified in Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). The pairwise
diﬀerences illustrate that two out of the three treatments (stars and large financial incentives) are
well balanced with respect to control and with respect to one another. In particular, we fail to reject
the null of equal means between stars and large financial margin for any of the fourteen variables
while the comparisons between stars and control and between large financial margin and control
reject the null of equal means at the 10% level for only one variable out of fourteen or 7%, i.e. less
than expected by chance. The unbalanced variable is the share of stylists who report “making people
look nice” and “being connected to the community” as the factors they enjoy the most about their
job over “making money” and “being my own boss”. We control for this variable in all specifications
and, reassuringly, it is not correlated with any of the outcomes of interest.
For the third treatment –small financial incentives– we reject the null of equal means vs. control
at the 10% level for four variables: the share of stylists who report “making people look nice” and
“being connected to the community” as the factors they enjoy the most about their job, the number
of products sold in the salons, the share of stylists with low socioeconomic status, and the share of
stylists who cannot speak English. As the latter implies low socioeconomic status by definition, the
null of equal means vs. control is eﬀectively rejected at the 10% level for 21% of the variables (3 out
of 14). While none of these three are correlated with the outcomes of interest, it is important to bear
this in mind when comparing the small financial incentives treatment to control. The comparison of
interest, however, is the one between the two financial incentive treatments which allows us to test
16Salons/shops that reported planning to close/move in the next six months were excluded from the sample, as
were neighborhoods that contained only one salon.
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whether financial incentives crowd out motivation when they are low-powered, as found in Gneezy
and Rustichini (2000). Reassuringly, the two financial incentives treatments are balanced on all
variables.
Finally, we present two tests of the null hypothesis that all pairwise diﬀerences of means are
jointly equal to zero. The first is the standard asymptotic test, and the second is based on the
empirical distribution of the same test statistic derived from 10,000 simulated random draws. We
present both because asymptotic tests tend to over-reject the null when the number of covariates
is large relative to the number of randomization units (Hansen and Bowers 2008). In our case
the asymptotic test rejects the null of balance (p = 0.014), while the test based on the empirical
distribution fails to reject (p = 0.760).
3 Identification
To evaluate the eﬀect of diﬀerent incentive schemes on sale performance we estimate:
yic = α+
3￿
j=1
δ0jtreat
j
c +Xiηi + uic (3.1)
where yic measures condom sales by agent i located in area c over the year. Our main measure
of sales performance is the same as that used to compute rewards, that is, the number of packs
each stylist buys from SFH over the study period, excluding the 12 packs purchased at training.
For robustness, we also estimate (3.1) using sales as calculated by SFH sales representatives by
subtracting the hairdresser’s stock at month t from the sales representative’s record of stock at
t − 1. Sales representatives measure stock each time they visit the salon by counting the number
of packs on display and confirming with the stylists that no other packs are stored elsewhere. This
measure includes the 12 packs purchased at training.
treatjc denotes the three treatment groups and Xi is a vector of agents’ characteristics that can
be correlated with sales. These include: whether salon is a barbershop (does not have female clients)
and number of employees, stylist’s sales experience, religion, socio-economic status and wealth, and
motivation for hairdressing and the HIV cause. The outcome variables and stylist- and salon-level
characteristics are reported in Table 1.
Errors are clustered at the level of the randomization unit, the geographical grid-cell area c,
throughout. We estimate equation (3.1) on the entire sample of stylists who came to training and
hence were exposed to treatment. Since agents choose whether to participate in the program after
learning about incentives, the coeﬃcients δ0j capture the eﬀect of incentives on sales performance
through both the margins of selection and eﬀort. In this setting, however, the role of selection is
limited since almost all the agents who were exposed to treatment joined the program. Section 4
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presents detailed evidence on this issue.
The coeﬃcients δ0j measure the causal eﬀect of the treatments on sales performance under
the identifying assumption that treatjc is orthogonal to uic. This notwithstanding, the identifying
assumption fails if the decision to participate in the training program is not orthogonal to treatment,
or if there are spillovers between treatments. We discuss these in turn below.
3.1 Participation decision
The randomization algorithm yields a sample of 1,222 hairstylists to be invited to the one day
training program and subsequently, to sell condoms. SFH representatives managed to deliver the
invitation letter to 981 stylists. The letter, reproduced in appendix figure A.1, stressed both private
and public benefits of the program. In particular, the letter suggested that joining the program
might attract new customers to the salons and might help the community by facilitating HIV
prevention. In the case of multi-stylist salons, the invitation is extended to the person responsible
for the management of the salon, who is either the owner or the general manager. To attract the
largest possible number of agents and ensure a representative sample, stylists are oﬀered 40,000
ZMK (USD 8) to attend the one-day training. This is over 13 times the average price of a haircut
and is therefore likely to exceed the stylists’ expected earnings for a weekday. Using information
on self-reported earnings, 40,000 ZMK corresponds to 69 percent of weekly earnings for the median
salon.
Of the 981 stylists who received the invitation letter, 771 attended the training, perhaps as a
result of the generous show-up fee and/or the financial and social benefits from joining the program,
as stated in the letter. During training, stylists are provided with information on HIV/AIDS, female
condom promotion, basic business skills, and program details, including the randomly assigned
compensation package.17
Regardless of the high participation rate, the identifying assumption fails if the treatments aﬀect
selection at either stage. However, since stylists were not informed about treatments until the end
of training, selection ought to be orthogonal to treatment. Appendix table A.2 reports the estimates
of
pic = α+
3￿
j=1
θ0jtreat
j
c +Xiη + εic (3.2)
where pic is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the agent receives the invitation letter in columns 1
and 2, and an indicator variable equal to 1 if the agent chooses to attend training in columns 3 and
4. Xi is a vector of agents’ characteristics that can be correlated with the participation decision.
17The training took place between October and December 2009 and lasted for 40 days, running from Monday
through Thursday for 10 weeks, with a maximum of 50 stylists attending in a single day. Training sessions were
staggered and balanced across treatment groups, so that the timing of the training did not vary systematically
between treatments.
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Reassuringly, the estimates in appendix table A.2 clearly show that the participation decision is
orthogonal to treatment: all coeﬃcients θ0j are small and not significantly diﬀerent from zero.18
3.2 Spillovers
The identifying assumption fails if, because of spillovers, the control group is not a proper coun-
terfactual for how agents in the treatment groups would have behaved in the absence of treatment.
This might be the case if, for instance, agents in the control group change their behavior as a result
of knowing that other agents have been oﬀered rewards. Four design features were employed to
minimize the risk of spillovers across treatment groups.
First, we created a 150-meter buﬀer zone between each geographical area in which salons are
located to ensure that each agent neighbors either other stylists in the same treatment group or
stylists who are not part of the program. While the research design ensures that all stylists in
the same geographical area are assigned to the same treatment, this precaution can be undone by
stylists relocating after randomization is carried out. Relocated stylists were allowed to stay in the
program only if they moved within the same geographical area or to a new area with the same
treatment as their original assignment.19
Second, stylists attended the training with other stylists belonging to the same treatment group.
Third, the enumerators who delivered the invitation letters were themselves unaware of which
training day pertained to which treatment. Fourth, the program was designed to appear similar
across treatment groups to an outside observer. Most importantly, the sale price was identical across
treatments and all stylists received the same promotional materials, which included aprons, “sold
here” signs, t-shirts and diﬀerent types of posters. The sole exception to this rule is the thermometer
poster, which was given only to stylists in the star treatment.
To assess the potential for spillovers through the stylists’ social network, our baseline survey
asked respondents about their relationships with other stylists in Lusaka. Reassuringly, the median
stylist reported only one connection, whether a relative, friend or acquaintance, with another stylist
in the city. To monitor the evolution of this variable over the course of the program, we collected
information on new connections with other stylists during each monthly visit. During the first
four months of the program, 60 to 80 percent of stylists reported at least one new connection with
another stylist in the city. After the fourth month, very few new connections were reported. Over
18The decision to attend training is correlated with some individual characteristics, such as gender (barbers are more
likely to attend), and self-reported donations to HIV-related causes. Stylists who attend training are five percentage
points more likely to report giving to HIV charities. While this is in line with the theoretical literature that suggests
that agents in mission-driven organizations share an interest in the mission, the magnitude of the diﬀerence between
participants and non-participants is small, as the vast majority of invited stylists chooses to participate.
19Only 12 cases occurred in which the salon moved and remained in operation and staﬀed by the stylist involved
in the research project. In 7 of these cases, the salon relocated within the same treatment cell. Three of the cases
involved movement into a buﬀer area and the remaining 2 cases involved relocation to a diﬀerent treatment. These
salons were dropped from the study and all subsequent restocking observations are recorded as zeros.
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90 percent of the new acquaintances reported during the first four months met during the training
and are therefore in the same treatment group. Finally, to detect spillovers and identify the stylists
who might be aﬀected by them during the course of the experiment, we asked sales representatives
to note all questions and complaints at every monthly visit. In over 7,000 restocking visits, only
one stylist asked about diﬀerent incentive schemes.20
While these three pieces of evidence are reassuring, they cannot completely rule out that agents
in one treatment eﬀectively responded to not being assigned to another. In the next section, we
will exploit variation in treatments of neighboring areas to assess the empirical relevance of this
concern.
4 The Eﬀect of Incentives on Sale Performance
We begin by estimating equation (3.1) to evaluate the eﬀect of the three experimental reward
treatments on overall sales performance. Throughout, we report estimates of δ0j , with and without
a vector of salons’ and agents’ characteristics that can aﬀect the willingness or ability to sell female
condoms, and therefore explain some of the variation in sales.
As discussed above, we estimate equation (3.1) on the entire sample of stylists who came to
training and hence were exposed to treatment. This implies that the coeﬃcients δ0j capture the
eﬀect of incentives on sales performance through both the margins of selection and eﬀort. The next
two sections provide evidence on the relative importance of these margins.
4.1 Selection
Of the 771 stylists attending the training, 747 (97%) joined. Not surprisingly, columns 1 and 2
of appendix table A.3 show that incentives had no impact on the decision to join. Stylists could also
choose to quit during the course of the experimental year at no cost. Only 58 stylists (7.5 percent
of those exposed to treatment) did so; of these, 53 never made a sale. The eﬀect of the incentive
treatments on the choice to select out is small for all treatments and significantly diﬀerent from zero
(p = 0.084) only for agents in the small financial-margin treatment when accounting for individual
and salon characteristics, as shown in column 4 of appendix table A.3.
Overall, only 10 percent of the 771 stylists who were exposed to treatment selected out of the
program either at training or later during the year, and the incentive treatments did not aﬀect
either selection decision. This implies that the coeﬃcients δ0j capture the eﬀect of incentives on
sales through eﬀort rather than through selection.
20Most questions regarded queries that originated from customers on the characteristics of the product. The most
common complaint was that the condoms were diﬃcult to sell.
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4.2 Sales
Figures 2 and 3, and table 2 show the eﬀect of incentives on average sales and at diﬀerent points
of the sale distribution.
Beginning with average sales, figure 2 shows that there is a striking diﬀerence between stylists
in the star treatment and all others. Agents in the star treatment sell twice as many packs over the
year. This is confirmed by the estimates in columns 1 and 2 of table 2. Four findings are of note.
First, agents in the star treatment sell 7.48 more packs, which is over twice as many packs as stylists
in the control group. This result is robust to the inclusion of stylist-, salon- and area characteristics,
and is not driven by outliers in the star treatment group.21 Second, neither financial-incentive
treatment aﬀects sales.22 Both coeﬃcients are substantially smaller than the coeﬃcient on the star
treatment and are not significantly diﬀerent from zero. The null hypothesis that the eﬀect of either
financial treatment is equal to the eﬀect of the star treatment can also be rejected at the 1 percent
level or lower. The evidence thus casts doubt on the relevance of a specific form of crowding-out
eﬀect, namely that crowding-out only dominates when financial rewards are low-powered, so that
small rewards reduce performance while large rewards increase it (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000).23
While the sales level of the average stylist is low, the diﬀerence between treatments is large in
aggregate. The estimates in column 2, Table 2 imply that if all of the 771 agents had been oﬀered
non-financial incentives, they would have sold 23,102 condoms; that is, 12,416 more condoms than
the counterfactual scenario, in which they were all recruited as volunteers. Had they all been oﬀered
small or large financial margins, they would have sold 12,006 and 12,562 condoms, respectively.24
21We obtain similar results if the top 1 percent of sellers are dropped from the sample.
22As noted in footnote 12, agents in the large financial-margin treatment face a lower marginal cost (50 instead of
500) and could, in principle, have boosted sales by reducing the price. While this does not invalidate the identification
of the eﬀect of incentives on sales performance, it changes the interpretation of the eﬀect of incentives on eﬀort. We
do not observe agents choosing this strategy in equilibrium. Our end-line survey shows that only four stylists reported
ever selling a pack at a price lower than 500 ZMK, and none of them were in the large financial-margin treatment.
This, of course, does not rule out that the agents tried lowering the price, but this had no eﬀect on sales, which is
consistent with demand for this product being inelastic. The stylists’ ability to take advantage of the low elasticity
to increase price was limited by the fact that the same product was available from other outlets, e.g., chemists and
drugstores, at 500 ZMK. Unbranded versions were available free of charge from health clinics. In our focus groups,
both stylists and customers report some sales at 1,000 ZMK. We note that at this price, stylists in the control group
and star treatment also get a margin per pack sold (500 ZMK), but this is considerably lower than the margin received
by stylists in HPFT (950 ZMK), so that the ranking of treatments in terms of incentive power is unchanged as long
as stylists in all treatments are able to sell at the same price.
23To be specific, our 95-percent confidence interval on low financial incentives relative to the volunteer control
group allows us to rule out negative coeﬃcients greater than 2.2 packs, or 0.12 standard deviations. As a comparison,
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) find a crowding-out eﬀect of 0.54 standard deviations associated with paying a low
financial incentive, and Ariely et al. (2009) find a 0.16 standard deviation decrease associated with public payment
of financial incentives. We are therefore able to rule out crowding-out eﬀects of the magnitudes found in these two
papers at α < 0.025.
24To express these diﬀerences in a more relevant metric for comparing public health outcomes, our estimates
imply that oﬀering non-financial incentives to all agents would have saved 116 disability-adjusted life years (DALYs),
compared to 54 DALYs in the counterfactual volunteer scenario, 60 DALYs with small financial margins, and 63
DALYs with large financial margins. This calculation is based on a model calibrated for Zambia by Population
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Third, we find that our experimental measure of motivation is correlated with sales and the eﬀect
is large: agents who donate more than the median amount to the HIV charity sell 3.35 more packs,
which is equal to 42 percent of the eﬀect of star rewards and almost 50 percent of the baseline mean
of 6.96 in the control group. The fact that the donation in the experimental game predicts sales
reassures us that social pressure to donate, if any, did not mask actual diﬀerences in motivation.
To allay concerns that the donation measure captures diﬀerences in wealth, the regression includes
a measure of the stylist’s own assets. This is correlated with the value of donation, as expected,
but not with sales. Since self-reported assets might be measured with substantial noise, we also use
information on whether the agent has completed primary school and whether they speak English,
which are good proxies of socio-economic status in our setting. This measure is also correlated with
donation but not with sales. Fourth, the following agent characteristics are correlated with sales:
barbers sell 2.75 more packs, possibly reflecting the fact that men are in charge of contraceptive
choices in our setting, promoters with previous sales experience sell 5.11 more packs and Roman
Catholics sell 3.57 fewer packs. The eﬀect of the star treatment is thus larger than the eﬀect of any
personal characteristic.
Fourth, column 3 shows that all results are robust to using sales calculated by SFH representa-
tives as the outcome variable. Recall that our main outcome variable does not include the 12 packs
the agents purchased at training, as all agents were required to do so and these are not counted for
the computation of rewards. In contrast, the calculated sales measure includes these 12 packs (if
sold) and its mean is correspondingly higher. The qualitative results are unchanged, as agents in
the star treatment sell more than agents in any other treatment group. Consistently with the fact
that the calculated sales variable is measured with error, both the estimated star-treatment eﬀect
and the eﬀect of other agents’ traits (pro-social motivation, type of salon, religion, sales experience)
are somewhat smaller but precisely estimated throughout. Appendix table A.4 shows that results
are also robust to winsorizing (at 90% and 95%) alternative samples and SFH representatives fixed
eﬀects.
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of sales in the four groups. The distribution exhibits bunch-
ing at 0, 12 and 24 packs, probably due to the fact that while stylists could purchase one pack at
a time from SFH, buying one dispenser (12 packs) saves on transaction costs. Overall, 62 percent
of stylists sell no packs other than those purchased at training, 22 percent sell between 0 and 12,
and 16 percent sell 24 or more.25 Conditional on selling any, stylists sell an average of 24 packs in
addition to the 12 purchased at training. Figure 3 shows that the treatment eﬀects diﬀer on the
Service International (PSI 2012). The cost per DALY saved by enrolling all 771 agents in a single contract type,
including both fixed and variable costs, is USD 2,060 in the volunteer contract group, USD 1,843 in the low financial
scheme, USD 1,769 in the high financial scheme and USD 972 in the star reward group. To put this cost in context,
Garber and Phelps (1997) estimate the value of a DALY at approximately twice annual income. The per-capita
annual income in Zambia in 2010 was USD 1,020, so the cost of the star reward treatment compares favorably to the
value of the health benefits it generates.
25Results are robust to estimating Tobit models.
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extensive and intensive margins. In particular, 47 percent of agents in the star treatment sell at
least one pack besides those purchased at training, compared to 35 percent in the other groups. The
figure also illustrates that the average diﬀerence between the star treatment and the other three
groups is driven by agents who sell more than 12 packs. This is confirmed by the estimates in
columns 4, 5 and 6 of table 2.
Column 4 of table 2 shows that the likelihood of selling at least one pack in addition to those
purchased at training is 11.4 percentage points higher for agents in the star treatment; this represents
a 31-percent increase over the mean of the control group. Agents in the high- and low financial-
margin treatments are equally likely to sell at least one pack as agents in the control group. Columns
5 and 6 show that the diﬀerence across treatments is stable at diﬀerent points of the distribution in
absolute value, but it increases in proportion to the mean level in the control group. Promoters in
the star treatment are 13 percentage points more likely to sell 12 or more packs, which is 38 percent
more than stylists in the volunteer treatment, and 10 percentage points more likely to sell 24 or
more, which is 79 percent more than stylists in the volunteer treatment. Promoters who are oﬀered
financial margins, either large or small, do not perform diﬀerently than stylists in the volunteer
treatment. All coeﬃcients are precisely estimated and very close to zero.
A possible explanation for why financial rewards are not eﬀective at promoting sales is that even
in the high margin treatment, earning potential was low because of low demand for the product.
Even stylists in the top quintile of sales and in the high margin treatment made only 3.5 percent of
self-reported annual earnings from condom sales. While field experiments on performance typically
analyze the eﬀect of incentives that account for a substantial share of earnings, two other experiments
use comparably small incentives and still find large positive eﬀects. Chetty et al. (?) show that
oﬀering academic referees a USD 100 gift card to complete their reports on time decreases median
survival times by 43 percent. The value of the incentive is equivalent to 0.1 percent of the average
assistant professor salary in the US.26 Goette and Stutzer (2008) show that oﬀering a lottery ticket
worth USD 4.3 increases blood donations by 12 percent among a large sample of potential donors
in Switzerland.
More importantly for the interpretation of our results, low demand cannot explain why non-
financial rewards are eﬀective, unless the non-financial reward treatment aﬀects demand directly.
Our research design allows us to rule out that the star treatment increases sales by aﬀecting demand,
an issue we will return to in section 6.
4.3 Spillovers and timing
Before delving into the mechanisms that underpin our findings, this section presents evidence
on two key issues for interpretation. First, we provide evidence that allays the concern that the
26Data from Scott and Sigfried (2011) refer to the mean salary of assistant professors in PhD-granting institutions.
Mean salaries for associate and full professors are USD 117,231 and USD 159,816, respectively.
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estimated eﬀect of the non-financial treatment might be contaminated by spillovers, namely by
agents in other treatments reacting to not having been given stars. As illustrated in figure 1, some
non-star areas border neighbor areas in the star treatments, whereas others do not. We exploit this
variation to test whether the agents who are more likely to be aﬀected by spillovers have higher or
lower sales. Reassuringly, we find that being close to agents in the star treatment does not aﬀect
sales for agents in other groups, which casts doubt on the relevance of spillovers in our setting. Of
the 586 salons not in the star treatment, 41 percent are located in areas adjacent to star treatment
areas, specifically in one of the 8 areas bordering a star treatment area. The estimated treatment
eﬀect for being adjacent to a star treatment area is 1.30 (s.e. 1.39).27
Second, we provide evidence that the treatment eﬀects are stable through time, thus ruling out
that the aggregate eﬀect of non-financial rewards on sales is due to the novelty of being oﬀered star
rewards, or similar forms of Hawthorne eﬀects. To do so, we exploit the fact that the SFH inventory
files contain the exact dates of restocking and estimate equation (3.1) in each month, using the same
set of controls and clustering errors at the same level of the randomization unit as above. Figure
4 reports month-specific treatment eﬀects. Two patterns are of note. First, the eﬀect of the star
treatment is positive and of similar magnitude in all months except the fifth, when it is close to
zero. This might be due to the torrential rains in months 3 and 4 depressing sales, so that agents
could not sell the stock purchased in those months and did not need to restock in month 5. The
magnitude of the star treatment eﬀect is somewhat higher in the first two months and above the
mean of the control group in most months, implying that agents in the star treatment sell at least
twice as many packs as agents in the control group at any given point in time. Not surprisingly,
however, the eﬀect on monthly sales is less precisely estimated than on yearly sales. Second, the
eﬀect of both large and small financial margins is close to zero in all months, suggesting again that
the aggregate results do not hide substantial heterogeneity through time.28
The stability over time of the eﬀect of non-financial incentives suggests that the eﬀectiveness of
the star reward is unlikely to be driven by the prospect of qualifying for the ceremony. This can
be inferred from the fact that, given the volume of sales, the threshold for being entitled to the
ceremony (216 packs sold in one year) was unattainable for most agents. Indeed, stylists who sold
at least one pack and who were assigned to star treatment sold on average 3.1 packs per month, and
27Although the concern for spillovers might be stronger from the star treatment, given the visibility of the ther-
mometer, we also check for spillovers from the financial margin treatments. Being in a cell adjacent to any financial
margin treatment has no statistically significant eﬀect on sales.
28We note that the observed pattern is consistent with agents in the star treatment exerting eﬀort only at the
beginning to establish a regular customer base, and sell to the same customers throughout the year. While this is not
the only interpretation of the patterns, from the principal’s point of view this is not less desirable than reaching new
customers, but the interpretation of the eﬀect of stars through time diﬀers if this is the case. To shed light on this
issue, we use the agents’ reports on whether the customers to whom they sold female condoms had used them before.
The share of sales made to customers who had never used a female condom is naturally higher in earlier months (80
percent in month 1) but remains substantial in later months (44 percent by month 10), suggesting that agents were
reaching out to new customers throughout the program. More importantly for the interpretation of the treatment
eﬀects, the share of new customers does not decline faster for agents in the star treatment.
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only one stylist managed to sell enough to qualify for the ceremony. Had the eﬀect of non-financial
incentives been driven by the ceremony component alone, it should have disappeared after a few
months, as most agents realized the threshold was far beyond reach. The same logic suggests that
the eﬀect of the star treatment is not driven by the fact that agents in that treatment were motivated
by career concerns, in the form of networking with high-ranking SFH oﬃcers at the ceremony, to
gain employment with the organization.29
5 Mechanisms
The evidence in the previous section indicates that, in this setting, non-financial incentives are
eﬀective at increasing sales, whereas financial incentives are not. This section provides evidence on
the mechanisms that underlie the treatment eﬀects estimated above. Since the evidence in section 4
shows that the diﬀerence between treatments is stable throughout the duration of the experiment,
the remainder of the paper will focus on aggregate year-long performance.
5.1 Agents eﬀort vs. customer demand
While all stylists are given the same posters and other promotional materials, a key diﬀerence
between the star treatment and all others is that only agents in the star treatment are given the
thermometer, which provides a visible measure of the stylists’ performance and their contribution
to the program. Visibility could, in principle, lead to higher sales for a given level of eﬀort through
an advertising eﬀect, or if the clients are altruistic vis-à-vis the stylists and buy packs to make
them earn stars, or still, if the clients take it as a signal of the agents’ type and buy packs because
they share an interest in the mission.30 Assessing whether stars result in higher sales because they
encourage eﬀort or increase demand is key for a correct interpretation of the findings and to derive
implications for incentive design.
To this purpose, we first test whether agents in the star treatment behave diﬀerently along
dimensions that are correlated with sales eﬀort, as measured during the monthly visits. Table 3
reports the estimates of equation 3.1 using eﬀort proxies as outcome variables. We find that agents
in the star treatment display 0.26 more materials (12 percent more than the mean of the control
group), are 7 percentage points more likely to fill in their logbooks (14 percent more than the mean
in the control group), and score 0.09 more points, or 1/5th of a standard deviation more, on the
29Stylists who participated in focus groups mentioned they were quick to realize the ceremony threshold was not
attainable, but that nevertheless, they were motivated by having a target and seeing how they progressed toward it
through sales.
30A related consideration is that the star treatment could have attracted more customers to the salon. We compare
the change in the number of salon customers between the baseline and the endline across treatment groups and find
no significant diﬀerences. Specifically, the change in the reported number of regular customers between baseline and
endline is small and imprecisely estimated in all treatment groups.
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“interest” variable recorded by the sales representatives. Stylists in the two financial margin schemes
do not diﬀer from the control group for any of these three measures of eﬀort. Finally, stylists in all
treatments appear to be equally interested during the sales representative’s demonstration. Overall,
the results in table 3 indicate that, in line with the eﬀect on sales, non-financial incentives promote
eﬀort on three out of the four dimensions that we can measure, and the average standardized eﬀect
of all four, while financial incentives do not.
Next, we test whether the star treatment changes customers’ behavior, leading to higher sales.
First, we survey 2,000 customers to assess directly whether they report being aﬀected by the ther-
mometer.31 We ask customers whether they had seen promotional materials for female condoms in
hair salons and, if so, to describe what that they had seen. Overall, 37 percent of the interviewees
report having seen promotional materials. Of these, 92 percent had seen the promotional poster
(which is the largest and most visible of the materials distributed), 36 percent had seen the “sold
here” sign, and only 2 percent, or 15 people in total, report seeing the thermometer. Of these 15, 5
had previously used a female condom, but none had bought them at a hair salon. This casts doubt
on the interpretation that the thermometer attracts more attention than the standard promotional
materials, giving stylists in the non-financial treatment an advertising advantage.
Given the low sales volume, however, the customer survey might fail to capture the responses
of the small subset of customers who are indeed aﬀected by the thermometer. The second step of
our strategy consists of distributing a placebo star reward treatment to a random sample of salons
in the volunteer control group and the two financial treatments. In the 8th restocking cycle, we
distributed placebo thermometers to a randomly-selected half of the salons not in the star treatment
and standard promotional posters to the remaining half. The placebo thermometer looks identical
to those given to stylists in the star treatment, except that the number of stars reflects average
sales by all salons, rather than the individual salon sales. The eﬀect of the placebo thermometer
on sales gives us a measure of the eﬀect of the star treatment through advertising, as salons in the
placebo treatment look the same to an outside observer as salons in the star treatment.32 Table 4
compares the eﬀect of the placebo thermometer to that of the star treatment. Two comparisons are
of interest. Column 1 estimates treatment eﬀects for all agents at the same point in time, that is in
the visit round that follows the distribution of the placebo thermometer. The comparison is thus
clear of time-varying factors that might aﬀect sales in all treatment groups. Column 2 estimates
31To interview customers we selected 16 dense Lusaka markets, four for each experimental treatment. Surveyors
conducted random-intercept surveys with individuals in the markets by approaching every fifth individual entering
through the main market entrance, and asked if they would be willing to answer a few questions. Once consent was
obtained, we asked whether the respondent frequented a hair salon in the market where the survey took place and
a very brief set of survey questions about demographics, familiarity with the female condom, sources of information,
purchase behavior and own sexual practices.
32Note that the placebo thermometer does not allow us to rule out whether clients buy packs to help the hairstylist
accumulate stars, because, by design, the number of stars in the placebo thermometer does not reflect individual
sales. Our earlier finding that none of the clients who report having seen the thermometer buy condoms from the
stylists casts doubt on the relevance of this mechanism.
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treatment eﬀects in the first period after the treatment was implemented. This is period 1 for the
star treatment and period 9 for agents who received the placebo thermometer in round 8. This
comparison is thus clear of factors, such as novelty eﬀects, that might aﬀect sales right after the
treatment is implemented. In both columns, the star reward has a positive significant eﬀect while
the placebo thermometer has a small and imprecisely estimated eﬀect on sales.
Table 4 shows that the placebo star reward has no eﬀect on sales and its eﬀect is significantly
diﬀerent from that of the star treatment. Columns 3 and 4 explore the possibility that the eﬀect
of the placebo star reward is biased downward because stylists might have unsold stock from which
they might sell, and our measure of performance (restocking) fails to capture that. The results in
columns 3 and 4 suggest that this is not the case. Overall, table 4 indicates that the thermometer is
not an eﬀective advertising instrument, casting further doubts on the hypothesis that non-financial
rewards aﬀect sales by changing customer behavior.
5.2 Pro-social motivation and the response to incentives
Results in table 2 make clear that both rewards and pro-social motivation aﬀect sales perfor-
mance. We now provide evidence on their interaction, namely on whether they reinforce or crowd
out each other. To assess this, we allow the eﬀects of incentives to be heterogeneous as a function of
the agent’s pro-social motivation. Table 5 reports the estimated coeﬃcients of the following model:
yic = α+Xiβ + γσi +
3￿
j=1
δ0jtreat
j
c ∗ (1− σi) +
3￿
j=1
δ1jtreat
j
c ∗ σi + uic (5.1)
where σi = 1 if the agent’s donation in the adapted dictator game is above the median and zero
otherwise, and all other variables are defined above. δ0j measures the eﬀect of treatment j for agents
for whom σi = 0 (low motivation). This is identified from the comparison of low motivation agents
in treatment j to low motivation agents in the volunteer treatment. Likewise, δ1j measure the eﬀect
of treatment j for agents for whom σi = 1 (high motivation). This is identified from the comparison
of high motivation agents in treatment j to high motivation agents in the volunteer treatment.
The results in column 1, table 5 indicate that non-financial incentives leverage pro-social moti-
vation. In particular, high motivation stylists in the star treatment sell δˆ1j = 10.5 (s.e. 3.4) more
packs than high motivation stylists in the volunteer group while low motivation stylists in the star
treatment sell δˆ0j = 4.5 (s.e. 2.9) more packs than low motivation stylists in the volunteer group.
The p-value of the test of the null that δˆ1j − δˆ0j = 0 is 0.091.
Perhaps more surprisingly, the findings in table 5 indicate also that high financial margins appear
to leverage pro-social motivation; namely, for the high financial reward treatment, δˆ1j = 3.5 (s.e.
2.5), δˆ0j = −2.2 (s.e. 1.6) and the p-value of the test of the null that δˆ1j − δˆ0j = 0 is 0.029. The
95% confidence interval of the interaction between high motivation and high financial incentives
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spans from 0.579 to 10.77, ruling out a negative eﬀect of strong financial incentives on those with
high motivation. However we cannot rule out a negative eﬀect from small financial rewards, as the
interaction term of small financial incentives with high motivation is not significantly diﬀerent from
zero, with a p-value of 0.731 and a 95% confidence interval spanning -5.31 to 3.73.
These findings contribute to a body of laboratory and field experiments on charitable giving
(Ariely et al. 2009; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Lacetera et al. 2011; Mellström and Johannesson
2008) that test whether financial rewards crowd-out other sources of motivation. Most of these
studies focus on social reputation, namely the possibility that financial incentives reduce the repu-
tational gains from pro-social activities. In our setting, however, this channel is closed since the two
financial schemes and the control group were designed to be observationally identical to an outside
observer to minimize the risk of contamination via information spillovers. In particular, customers
could not observe whether agents were receiving rewards for condom sales, and all condoms were
sold at the same 500 ZMK price in all treatments. Since it is common practice for retail agents to
receive a margin on the price of the goods they sell, the most likely inference from the customer’s
perspective is that all hairstylists were paid monetary margins, but we cannot pin down customers’
beliefs in our setting (or, more germane for our analysis, hairstylists’ beliefs about customers’ be-
liefs about their motivation). More importantly, we would not expect diﬀerential inference about
incentives across the volunteer and financial treatments, particularly since stylists in the volunteer
control group have no way to credibly signal that they were not getting paid.33
Since it is unlikely that monetary incentives aﬀected the agents’ social image diﬀerentially across
treatments in our setting, we are able to assess the degree to which they might crowd out an agent’s
internal sense of motivation. This could happen through a self-signaling mechanism by which the
agents receive less “warm glow” because financial incentives make them re-assess their own motives
for devoting eﬀort to the task (Deci 1971; Andreoni 1990). Our findings suggest that this is not the
case.
5.3 Heterogeneous responses by the value of financial rewards
To provide evidence on the mechanisms that drive the response to financial incentives, we test
whether the eﬀectiveness of financial incentives depends on their value for diﬀerent agents. We
exploit the fact that, under the assumption of concave utility, the same amount of money is more
valuable for poor stylists. To proxy for socio-economic status we use information on the education
level and English-speaking ability of the stylist, and classify as “low socio-economic status” the 19
percent of stylists in our sample who either do not speak English or have not completed primary
33In addition, qualitative evidence from focus groups indicates no stigma attached to being paid for pro-social tasks,
possibly because Zambia is a very poor economy, and that tasks seem more valuable if a donor, NGO or government
is willing to pay for them. Customers reported that the price at which condoms were sold ruled out that stylists were
being paid extremely well for performing the task, and that knowing that they were paid a margin similar to that
paid for other products did not tarnish their reputation.
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education. In the absence of a reliable measure of wealth, these are the best proxies of socio-economic
status in our setting. We estimate:
yic = α+Xiβ + γφi +
3￿
j=1
δ0jtreat
j
c ∗ (1− φi) +
3￿
j=1
δ1jtreat
j
c ∗ φi + uic (5.2)
where φi = 1 if the agent’s socio-economic status is low and zero otherwise, and all other variables
are defined above. δ0j measures the eﬀect of treatment j for agents for whom φi = 0 (high socio-
economic status) and δ1j measure the eﬀect of treatment j for agents for whom φi = 1 (low socio-
economic status).
Column 2 of table 5 suggests evidence in favor of the hypothesis that financial incentives are
eﬀective when their relative value is higher, i.e. for low socio-economic status stylists. Compared to
low socio-economic status stylists in the volunteer treatment, low socio-economic status stylists sell
δˆ1j = 3.5 (s.e. 1.8) more packs when oﬀered large financial margins and δˆ1j = 4.7 (s.e. 2.9) more
packs when oﬀered small financial margins. The diﬀerence between the eﬀect of financial incentives
on low and high socio-economic status stylists is positive for both large and small incentives, but
it is not precisely estimated for either treatment (p-values are 0.146 and 0.326 for small and large
financial incentives, respectively).
5.4 Heterogeneous responses by the value of non-financial rewards
In line with the previous test, we now test whether the eﬀectiveness of non-financial incentives
depends on their relative value. To do so, we exploit the fact that treatments were randomized at
the neighborhood level and hence agents in diﬀerent neighborhoods have a diﬀerent number of peers;
that is, agents in the same treatment group, in their vicinity. As the non-financial treatment enables
stylists to make their sale performance visible to third parties, its eﬀectiveness might depend on the
number of peers who can see it. For instance, social prestige associated with stars or reputational
gains from contribution to society might be higher when they can be shown-oﬀ to a larger number
of people, or stylists might be motivated by wanting to outperform their peers, or encouraged by
the eﬀort of others dedicated to the same cause.34 To shed light on the practical relevance of this
mechanism, we allow the eﬀect of treatments to vary with the number of potential peers in the
vicinity of the stylists’ salons; that is, the number of trained stylists in the same geographical area.
By design, the randomization procedures ensure that the number of salons in each geographical
area is balanced across treatments (see appendix table A.1). This, together with the fact that
selection into training is orthogonal to treatment, implies that the average number of trained salons
is balanced as well. The median (mean) number of trained salons in an area is 3 (4.5) with a
34SFH representatives’ records from monthly visits indicate that, on average, the thermometer was publicly dis-
played in 43 percent of the star treatment salons and the literature on charitable giving provides evidence that
donations are larger when they are visible to others (Soetevent 2005; Karlan and McConnell 2014).
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standard deviation of 5, and none of the tests of equality of means between treatment pairs rejects
the null. Reassuringly, the distribution of the variable is also similar across treatments, and no
pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null of equality.
To evaluate whether the star treatment is more eﬀective when the peer group is larger, we
estimate:
yic = α+Xiβ + γN c +
3￿
j=1
δ0jtreat
j
c +
3￿
j=1
δ1jtreat
j
c ∗Nc + uic (5.3)
where Nc is the number of trained salons in area c, where the area is the unit of randomization and
covers 250,000 square meters. The specification thus controls for salon density, which itself may
aﬀect sales, regardless of treatment. For instance, customer demand for condoms might be higher
in areas with more salons because more customers transit through these areas, or lower if there are
more alternative outlets. Also, stylists in denser areas might be more eﬀective sellers because they
face stronger competitive pressure. The coeﬃcient γ captures these eﬀects.
The interaction coeﬃcient between the number of peers and the star treatment (δ1j = 1.03;
s.e. = 0.42) is statistically and economically significant. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient is such
that the eﬀect of stars increases by 5.3 packs (70 percent of the average eﬀect estimated in table
2) for one standard deviation increase of the number of peers. Figure 5 reports the marginal eﬀect
of the non-financial treatment (δ0j + δ1j ∗ Nc) evaluated at diﬀerent values of Nc with 95 percent
confidence bands. This shows that the eﬀect of stars is positive throughout and precisely estimated
when the number of peers is 5 or larger.
The findings suggest that the non-financial treatment partly works by allowing social compar-
isons; this does not necessarily imply that stylists compete to collect stars; rather, stylists might be
encouraged by the eﬀort of others, or the ability to observe others’ performances helps the stylists
assess what is expected of them.35 Indeed, stylists who participated in focus groups reported being
motivated by showing oﬀ their own sales levels and viewing the sales levels of their peers, and also
using the sales information on the thermometer to identify successful sellers to ask for sales tips.
The finding that the star treatment was significantly more eﬀective, the more dense the peer group,
is robust to alternative sample restrictions, such as trimming at the 95th percentile.36
To corroborate our interpretation that the interaction between the number of peers and the star
treatment captures the incentive eﬀect of social comparison, we note that agents in areas with more
trained salons are significantly more likely to display the thermometer in their salons. One standard
35Further analysis, not reported, allows the eﬀect of non-financial incentives to be heterogeneous, according to the
stylists’ motivation for the cause, the number of possible peers and the interaction of the two. The evidence favors
the interpretation that the two mechanisms act independently; both high and low donors sell more when surrounded
by more peers, but high donors sell more for any given number of peers.
36Further analysis, not shown, indicates that the distance between salons within the same neighborhood does not
aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of the star treatment, presumably because neighborhoods are suﬃciently small (500 meters
by 500 meters).
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deviation increase in Nc is associated with a 14 percentage-point higher likelihood of displaying the
thermometer, a 23-percent increase from its mean value, and the correlation is precisely estimated.
Crucially, for the interpretation of our findings, this is not driven by agents choosing to advertise
more in denser areas; indeed the correlation between Nc and the likelihood of displaying other
promotional posters or the number of other promotional materials is small and not statistically
diﬀerent from zero.37
6 Conclusions
We conduct a field experiment to provide evidence on the eﬀectiveness of financial and non-
financial rewards within health services delivery. We find that agents who are oﬀered non-financial
rewards (“stars” in this setting) exert more eﬀort than either those oﬀered financial margins (10%
and 90% commission on the suggested retail price) or those oﬀered volunteer contracts, and generate
higher sales of packs of condoms per year. Non-financial rewards elicit eﬀort by leveraging the agents’
pro-social motivation and by facilitating social comparisons among agents. While we implemented a
specific type of non-financial reward, the general design principles are easily replicable and adaptable
to other settings. Our rewards were a linear function of sales, which minimized discouragement or
gaming eﬀects typically associated with non-linear schemes. Moreover, rewards were made clearly
visible to third parties, thus allowing social comparisons between diﬀerent agents engaged in the
same task, which proved eﬀective at eliciting eﬀort. Finally, they were awarded by a reputable and
well-known organization, which might have contributed to their value.
We designed the incentive treatments to reward sales performance rather than usage, since sales
performance can be precisely measured while usage cannot. It is nevertheless important to discuss
the link between sales and usage, since the health impact of the treatments depends on the latter.
We can provide two pieces of evidence indicating that customers indeed used the condoms. First,
the stylists’ logbooks, in which they are asked to record customer characteristics for every sale,
reveal that by the end of the experiment 56 percent of buyers had purchased female condoms at
least once before. This suggests the repeat customers used their previous purchases. Second, in line
37A second source of variation that might be associated with the utility weight of non-financial rewards is the
variation in the number of salon employees. In contrast to money, stars are not divisible and cannot be attributed
to the employee who made the sale, and the thermometer does not bear the name of any particular stylist working
in the salon. A priori, a larger number of employees might be associated with a lower value of non-financial rewards
if stylists free-ride on the eﬀort of their colleagues or with a higher value, if group dynamics lead to encouragement
and higher eﬀort. To provide evidence on whether this mechanism is relevant in our context, we allow the eﬀect of
non-financial incentives to be heterogeneous as a function of the number of employees. In our sample, 49 percent of
salons are operated by a single person, 34 percent have two employees, 12 percent have three and the remaining 5
percent have four or more. We find that the diﬀerence between financial and non-financial incentives is constant at
diﬀerent salon sizes, thus ruling out possible diﬀerences due to diﬀerences in divisibility. The power of this test is
limited by the observed variation in salon size, as most multi-employee salons are quite small, but, in our context,
we can rule out that the eﬀectiveness of non-financial incentives is due to their non-divisibility.
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with this, 13 percent of respondents to our customer survey report using the condom.
The customer survey data also reveals that the eﬀect of incentives on sales might actually
underestimate the eﬀect on usage. Indeed, while 17 percent of the respondents report receiving
information on female condoms from their stylists, only 0.5 percent report buying from them because
(unbranded) female condoms were available at the same price through other outlets such as chemists
and bars, and available free of charge from health clinics. However, the share of respondents who
ever used a female condom is more than double among those who report receiving information from
their stylists (27 percent) vs. those who do not (12 percent), suggesting that the eﬀect of the agents’
eﬀort in promoting the condoms on usage is larger than the eﬀect on sales through hair salons.
Two considerations are important to inform the scaling-up of the non-financial reward treatment.
First, the fact that stars are more eﬀective when stylists are surrounded by other stylists in the same
treatment suggests that the eﬀect estimated from a share of treated stylists might be a lower bound
for the eﬀect stars would have when oﬀered to all stylists, as the number of potential peers would
be larger in the latter case. Second, the fact that the eﬀect of stars is stable throughout the
experimental year provides reasons for cautious optimism that this scheme might be eﬀective at
motivating agents in the long run. While we cannot measure the eﬀect past the experimental year,
the absence of a clear trend reassures us that the eﬀect is unlikely to discontinuously disappear as
the treatment is extended past the year.
As is often the case in field experiments, the interpretation of the findings and their wider
applicability depends on the key features of the specific setting. In our case, two features are of
note. The first key feature is that, to minimize the possibility of information spillovers among agents
in diﬀerent treatment groups, agents were not informed of the existence or type of rewards when
they were first invited to participate in the training for condom distribution. This reconciles our
finding that incentives do not aﬀect the selection of agents into the job with earlier evidence from
the private sector and from the laboratory that suggests substantial selection eﬀects (Bandiera et al.
2007; Dohmen and Falk 2011; Larkin and Leider 2012; Lazear 2000; Lazear et al. 2012). In general,
we expect incentives to aﬀect selection, since diﬀerent schemes might attract diﬀerent numbers and
types of agents. This is likely to be particularly relevant in the social sector to the extent that
organizations are better oﬀ by hiring agents who are attracted by the mission as opposed to a
generous incentive scheme.
The second key feature of our setting is that the task at hand is not the agents’ main occu-
pation and the agents we study have selected entrepreneurship in the private sector as their main
occupation. Non-financial rewards might be more eﬀective for them because they reward the only
pro-social component of their jobs. On the other hand, if non-financial rewards interact with the
agents’ pro-social motivation, they might be even more eﬀective for agents who self-select into the
social sector as their main occupation. Ultimately, to assess whether and how non-financial rewards
can be eﬀective in other settings, future research will need to provide evidence on how the nature
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of the reward interacts with the nature of the task to attract, motivate and retain employees.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Outcome variables mean median min max sd N
Packs sold (restocked) 9.01 0.00 0.00 216.00 18.08 771
Packs sold (calculated) 13.90 12.00 0.00 148.00 15.77 771
Promoter attention 2.52 2.56 0.00 3.00 0.30 725
Promoter interest 2.15 2.12 0.00 3.00 0.38 697
Logbook filled 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.23 725
Total displays (promotional material) 2.26 2.20 0.00 8.00 0.90 726
Panel B: Control variables 
Salon is a barbershop (0-1) 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 771
Salon is near a bar (0-1) 0.88 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.32 770
Salon size (number of employees) 1.75 2.00 1.00 9.00 0.99 770
Number of trained salons in the same area 4.46 3.00 1.00 30.00 5.06 173
Stylist sells other products in salon (0-1) 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 771
Stylist is in bottom quartile of asset distribution (0-1 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.40 771
Stylist's socio-economic status is low (0-1) 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.40 771
Stylist's dictator-game donation (Kwacha) 5,728.94 5,000.00 0.00 40,000.00 3,744.67 767
Stylist’s reported work motivation is intrinsic (0-1) 0.58 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 771
Stylist’s religion is Catholic (0-1) 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.42 771
Panel C: Other Descriptors
Monthly income of the salon (Kwacha) 332,569 250,000 0 10,000,000 572,050 700
Stylist can read and write in at least one language (0 0.94 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.23 771
Stylist can read and write in English (0-1) 0.85 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.35 770
Total number of products sold  0.47 0.00 0.00 6.00 0.94 771
Notes: Sample includes all salons that attended training (N=771). Packs sold (restocked) is the total number of packs
(excluding the initial dispenser sold at training) that the stylist chooses to buy and restock over the study period, based on
invoices. Packs sold (calculated) is the number of packs sold, including the initial dispenser sold at training, based on sales
agents' calculations. Promoter attention is a measure of stylist's level of attention, on average, across all sales agent visits
during the “interpersonal communication” session on a 0-3 scale (with 0 being “not interested,” and 3 being “very
interested”). Similarly, Promoter interest is the sales agent's subjective rating, on average, of the stylist's level of interest in
promoting female condoms on a scale of 0 to 3. Logbook filled is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if filled-in
logbook sheets were collected by the sales agent, averaged across non-missing visits. Total displays is the average number of
posters, brochures, "sold here" signs, flipcharts, condom dispensers, and certificates visible in the shop during non-missing
restocking visits. Salon is a barbershop equals 1 if the salon is marked as a barber (and not a hairdresser or mixed). A salon
was considered near a bar if there was a bar within a 5-minute walk. The number of trained salons in the same area average
across the 173 neighborhoods used as the unit of randomization along with training attendance outcomes. Stylists were
classified as having low socio-economic status if they could not read and write in English, or if they had not completed primary
school. The asset quartile was determined based on ownership of durables by the stylist. We define self-reported work
motivation to be intrinsic if the agent reports "being connected to the community" or "making people look nice" as their
preferred aspect of the job, in contrast to "making money" and "being own boss." Refer to online appendix C for more
details on variables. 
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Table 2: Average treatment eﬀects on sales
Dependent variable Packs sold (calculated)
=1 if sells at 
least one 
pack
=1 if sells 
12 or more 
packs
=1 if sells 
24 or more 
packs
Mean in control group 6.93 6.96 13.30 .368 .341 .128
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Large financial reward 0.769 1.187 -0.653 -0.003 0.01 0.031
[1.618] [1.759] [1.848] [0.067] [0.063] [0.042]
Small financial reward 0.378 0.826 -0.135 -0.025 -0.018 0.011
[1.528] [1.530] [1.603] [0.066] [0.060] [0.040]
Star reward 7.482*** 8.022*** 6.283** 0.114* 0.128* 0.101**
[2.448] [2.639] [2.451] [0.066] [0.065] [0.049]
Salon is a barbershop (0-1) 2.751* 3.193** 0.101** 0.098** 0.031
[1.600] [1.467] [0.039] [0.040] [0.031]
Salon is near a bar (0-1) 0.544 0.772 -0.048 -0.031 -0.005
[2.108] [1.971] [0.074] [0.063] [0.050]
Salon size (log number of employees) 2.379 1.195 -0.082 -0.069 0.037
[2.950] [2.917] [0.063] [0.063] [0.049]
Number of trained salons in the same area 0.02 0.069 0.001 0.000 -0.001
[0.087] [0.094] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Stylist sells other products in salon  (0-1) 5.110*** 2.758* 0.084** 0.085** 0.073**
[1.701] [1.542] [0.039] [0.041] [0.035]
Stylist in the bottom quartile of asset distribution (0-1) 1.303 0.448 0.006 -0.001 0.018
[1.743] [1.639] [0.051] [0.052] [0.036]
Stylist's socio-economic status is low (0-1) -1.048 -0.962 -0.008 -0.012 -0.042
[1.411] [1.212] [0.046] [0.047] [0.029]
Stylist's dictator-game donation above the median (0-1) 3.353*** 2.210** 0.152*** 0.143*** 0.016
[1.125] [1.115] [0.031] [0.032] [0.028]
Stylist's reported work motivation is intrinsic (0-1) -0.541 -0.458 -0.035 -0.034 -0.03
[1.298] [1.166] [0.036] [0.035] [0.031]
Stylist's religion is Catholic (0-1) -3.567** -3.163*** -0.085** -0.074* -0.035
[1.370] [1.185] [0.041] [0.040] [0.033]
Constant 6.929*** 0.175  8.176** 0.355*** 0.313*** 0.086
[1.123] [4.002] [3.957] [0.098] [0.093] [0.073]
R-squared 0.0285 0.0631 0.0526 0.0499 0.0482 0.0267
Observations 771 765 743 765 765 765
Large financial = Small financial (p-value) 0.803 0.823 0.747 0.694 0.578 0.583
Large financial = Stars (p-value) 0.00719 0.0108 0.00502 0.0517 0.0501 0.145
Small financial = Stars (p-value) 0.00365 0.00548 0.00725 0.018 0.0119 0.0502
Packs sold 
(restocked)
Notes: OLS estimates. Standard errors are clustered at cell level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. The dependent variable in
columns 1-5, Packs sold (restocked) is the total number of packs (excluding the initial dispenser sold at training) that the stylist
chooses to buy and restock during the study period, based on invoices. The dependent variable in column 6, Packs sold
(calculated) is the total number of packs sold (including the initial dispenser sold at training), based on representatives'
calculations. The sample size varies across columns because of missing values in some covariates. Variables are as described
in table 1. P-values in the bottom three rows are from a Wald test for equality of coefficients between treatments.
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Table 3: Average treatment eﬀects on eﬀort measures
Dependent variable Total displays
Logbook 
filled
Promoter 
attention
Promoter 
interest
Average 
standardize
d effect
Mean in control group 2.285 0.479 2.498 2.111
Standard deviation in control group 1.19 0.28 0.41 0.42
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Large financial reward 0.071 0.028 -0.004 0.024 0.029
[0.102] [0.029] [0.034] [0.035] [0.033]
Small financial reward -0.101 0.007 0.021 0.049 -0.006
[0.126] [0.028] [0.044] [0.049] [0.050]
Star reward 0.264** 0.067** -0.036 0.094** 0.097**
[0.127] [0.029] [0.034] [0.044] [0.042]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.099 0.0232 0.0317 0.0603
Observations 722 722 721 694 726
Large financial = Small financial (p-value) 0.151 0.5 0.529 0.603 0.49
Large financial = Stars (p-value) 0.108 0.189 0.32 0.128 0.108
Small financial = Stars (p-value) 0.0118 0.0582 0.167 0.437 0.07
Notes: OLS estimates weighted by the number of observations for each salon. All outcomes are
averages at the salon level across all restocking visits. Standard errors are clustered at the cell level. *
p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Total displays is the average number of posters, brochures, "sold here"
signs, flipcharts, condom dispensers, and certificates visible in the shop during non-missing restocking
visits. Logbook filled is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if filled-in logbook sheets were
collected by the sales agent, averaged across non-missing visits. Promoter attention is a measure of
stylist's level of attention, on average, across all sales agent visits during the “interpersonal
communication” session on a 0-3 scale (with 0 being “not interested,” and 3 being “very interested”).
Similarly, Promoter interest is the sales agent's subjective rating, on average, of the stylist's level of
interest in promoting female condoms, on a scale of 0 to 3). Column 5 reports the average
standardized effect for the four effort variables. All regressions include the same vector of controls as
in table 2. P-values in the bottom three rows are from a Wald test for equality of coefficients between
treatments.
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Table 4: Placebo star reward
Dependent variable
placebo round first round placebo round first round
Mean in control group 0.469 0.469 1.156 1.156
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Placebo thermometer 0.388 0.016 -0.067 0.016
[0.380] [0.400] [0.374] [0.400]
Star reward 1.699*** 1.721** 1.581*** 1.721**
[0.624] [0.689] [0.482] [0.689]
Controls yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.0633 0.0946 0.116 0.0946
Observations 319 318 319 318
Placebo thermometer = Stars (p-value) 0.0453 0.00836 0.000648 0.00836
Packs sold (restocked) Packs sold (calculated)
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at cell level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. The sample is
restricted to salons that completed a restocking visit in round 9, who were either in the star reward
treatment group or who received either a placebo thermometer or an additional promotional poster in
round 8. Placebo thermometer = 1 if stylist received a thermometer poster reporting average sales of
condoms across stars treatment (12 packs) during the previous restocking visit. The dependent
variable in columns (1) and (2), Packs sold (restocked) , is the number of packs (excluding the initial
dispenser sold at training) that the stylist chooses to buy and restock in the month following the
placebo intervention or the first round the treatment (either placebo or star) took effect, based on
invoices. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4), Packs sold (calculated) , is the number of packs
sold, including the initial dispenser sold at training, based on representatives' calculations. Columns (1)
and (3) report sales for the first round in which the placebo thermometer could affect sales (round 9).
Columns (2) and (4) report sales for the first round after the treatment was implemented (round one
for the star reward treatment and round 9 for the placebo thermometer and promotional material
control). One star reward treatment salon did not complete the first round restocking visit so is
dropped from columns (2) and (4). All regressions include the same vector of controls as in Table 2. P-
values in the bottom row are from a Wald test for equality of coefficients.
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Table 5: Heterogeneous treatment eﬀects, by stylist motivation
Dependent variable is Packs sold (restocked)
Motivation variable 
Stylist's 
dictator game 
donation is 
above the 
median
Stylist's socio-
economic 
status is low
Mean in control group = 6.96
(1) (2)
Motivation variable 0.778 -3.984**
[1.518] [1.605]
Effect of large financial when motivation variable =0 -2.215 0.806
[1.633] [2.095]
Effect of small financial when motivation variable =0 1.141 -0.041
[1.933] [1.705]
Effect of stars when motivation variable =0 4.537 7.462**
[2.859] [3.021]
Effect of large financial when motivation variable =1 3.462 3.542**
[2.476] [1.780]
Effect of small financial when motivation variable =1 0.352 4.741*
[1.889] [2.858]
Effect of stars when motivation variable =1 10.480*** 11.110***
[3.411] [3.126]
Controls yes yes
R-squared 0.07 0.064
Observations 765 765
Large financial: p-value of the null that difference by motivation variable=0 0.029 0.326
Small financial: p-value of the null that difference by motivation variable=0 0.731 0.146
Stars:p-value of the null that difference by motivation variable=0 0.091 0.350
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at cell level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. The dependent variable,
Packs sold (restocked) is the total number of packs (excluding the initial dispenser sold at training) that the stylist
chooses to buy and restock over the study period, based on invoices. All regressions include the same vector
of controls as in table 2. Variables are described in table 1. 
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Figure 1: Randomization of map cells into treatment groups
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Notes: Treatment groups and volunteer control group are shown by the grayscale tones.
The number of salons attending the training is written in each cell.
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Figure 2: Average yearly sales by treatment group
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Notes: Each bar measures the average number of packs sold over the year by agents in
each of the four groups with 95 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 3: Distribution of packs sold by treatment
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Notes: For each treatment group, packs sold are binned into the four categories displayed
on the x-axis. The height of the bars shows the share of the treatment in each bin, which
sum to one in each treatment. The error bars correspond to the 90 percent confidence
interval.
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Figure 5: Eﬀect of star rewards as function of the number of salons
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Notes: The solid line plots the imputed marginal eﬀect of the star treatment at each total number of salons in the same
neighborhood. This is computed as the sum of the coeﬃcient of stars plus the coeﬃcient of the interaction of stars and
number of salons in the same neighborhood, multiplied by the respective value of neighborhood density estimated in a
regression of sales on the three treatments, the three treatments interacted with neighborhood density, and controls. The
dotted lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval is based on standard errors clustered at the cell level.
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